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Abstract : 
 
Labour’s victory in the 1943 New Zealand general election allowed the party to set 
the political agenda in New Zealand not only for the remainder of the Second World 
War, but, arguably, for forty years thereafter. The outcome of the election hinged on 
the votes of service personnel engaged in fighting the Second World War. This paper 
examines why soldiers, airmen and sailors voted overwhelmingly for Labour in 1943. 
The papers shows, by conducting the first social class survey of an army in the 
Second World War, that the forces vote was not determined by the socio-economic 
background of the military cohort. Instead, through use of censorship summaries of 
the soldiers’ mail and the detailed returns showing the number of votes recorded for 
each candidate at each polling-place in the election, the paper finds that the most 
persuasive explanation for the pattern of voting among service personnel was their 
degree of participation in the war effort. The closer to combat a cohort of voters found 
themselves, the more they were inclined to manifest strong beliefs in fairness, social 
justice and ‘big Government’, key aspects of the Labour manifesto, in their franchise. 
A spirit of social cohesion had emerged from the exigencies of combat cohesion with 
profound implications for the future of New Zealand.  
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 In September 1943, the Labour Party, under the leadership of the incumbent 
Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, defeated Sidney Holland’s National Party in the 25th 
general election in New Zealand. The 45 seats (plus one allied independent) won by 
Labour gave them a majority of 12 over National, who won 34.2 Labour’s victory 
ensured that party politics remained active and confrontational in New Zealand for the 
duration of the Second World War.3 With a strong majority, Labour had a mandate to 
run the country and the war as it saw fit. It was able to continue its social and 
economic agenda, including nationalisations and social and employment reform.4 
Labour’s third successive electoral victory ensured that the balance in New Zealand 
politics lay firmly to the left. In the decades following the war, National adopted 
Labour’s social welfare agenda and became increasingly inclined towards a policy of 
                                                        
1 I am grateful to John Crawford, James Kitchen, Catherine Holmes and to two anonymous English 
Historical Review referees for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank Peter Cooke, Mary 
Slater, Carolyn Carr and all the librarians at the Defence Library, Headquarters New Zealand Defence 
Forces, for their research assistance. 
2 John E. Martin, The House: New Zealand’s House of Representatives 1854-2004 (Palmerston North: 
Dunmore Press, 2004), pp. 213-14; Michael Bassett and Michael King, Tomorrow Comes the Song: 
The Life of Peter Fraser (Auckland: Penguin, 2000), pp. 205, 223-4. An election had been due to take 
place in New Zealand in 1941, but, with the war situation deteriorating after setbacks in the 
Mediterranean, Labour introduced a Prolongation of Parliament Bill that autumn. National agreed to 
delay a vote on the understanding that there would be as little contentious legislation as possible put 
before the House. With the collapse of the War Administration in October 1942, however, the 
agreement to postpone the election lapsed and the poll took place during September 1943. 
3 F.L.W. Wood, Political and External Affairs: The Official History of New Zealand in the Second 
World War (Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, 1958), p. 266. 
4 Robert Chapman, ‘From Labour to National’, in Geoffrey W. Rice (ed.),  The Oxford History of New 
Zealand (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 368-9. The Bank of New Zealand and Internal 
Airways were nationalised (in 1945) and the coalmines were nationalised gradually; a Minimum Wage 
Act was introduced, also in 1945. 
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full employment. So great was the significance of the victory, that Robert Chapman 
has argued that successive Labour successes in this period ‘set the terms of political 
debate and action [in New Zealand] for the next forty years’.5  
 
 The election, however, was a far closer contest than Labour’s majority of 12 
seats indicates. Forty thousand, out of a total of 950,000 votes, were cast for 
Democratic Labour, a party to Labour’s left. These votes ‘cannibalised’ the Labour 
vote and contributed to the loss of eight seats to National compared to their showing 
in 1938. In fact, with the civilian votes counted, it appeared that the Government was 
very close to defeat in an additional six key seats (Eden, Nelson, Oamaru, Otaki, 
Palmerston North and Wairarapa). It was only when the armed service votes ‘were 
added to the [domestic] totals’ that the Government survived by narrowly holding on 
to all six seats.6 Had National won these constituencies, the House would have been 
split evenly between the two parties and there is every chance that the Government 
would have fallen, with profound implications for the war effort and the shape of the 
post-war political economy of New Zealand. Fraser later commented, ‘it was not only 
North Africa that the Second Division had saved’.7  
 
 That the soldiers’ vote saved Labour in 1943 is well documented in the 
                                                        
5 Ibid., p. 351. 
6 Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, pp. 255-6. The Electoral Amendment Act 1940 granted 
the right to vote to members of New Zealand’s armed forces serving in any part of the world. See ANZ 
WAII/1/DA565/1 N.Z.E.F. Times, 2 August 1943. 
7 Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 256; Appendices to the Journals of the House of 
Representatives, 1944 Session I, H-33a; ANZ WAII/1/DA565/1 Major W.A. Bryan, Report on the 
Conduct of the 1943 General Election in the Middle East. Nelson was won by an Independent who 
voted with Labour. Palmerston North was lost by an Independent who voted with National. It is also 
conceivable that a truly non-party war administration, as advocated by Holland, might have been 
installed. 
 4 
historiography.8 However, to date, in spite of a growing corpus of work on voting 
behaviours in New Zealand,9 there is no in-depth study of the factors that may have 
affected why the soldiers voted overwhelmingly for Labour. 10  This gap in the 
historiography is not unique; there is a lacuna in literature on war and political and 
social change in the twentieth century more generally. The growing consensus that the 
wars of the twentieth century ‘laid the basis’ for important reforms, most notably the 
birth of the modern welfare state,11 has been driven almost exclusively by studies of 
the home front in war;12 too rarely have scholars investigated how citizens at the 
battlefront have affected change.13  
                                                        
8 See, for example, J.R.S. Daniels, ‘The General Election of 1943’ (Masters Thesis, Victoria 
University, 1961), p. 333; Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 256; Michael Bassett, The 
State in New Zealand, 1840-1984: Socialism Without Doctrines? (Auckland: Auckland University 
Press, 1998), pp. 234-5; Neill Atkinson, Adventures in Democracy: A History of the Vote in New 
Zealand (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2003), p. 154. 
9 See, for example, Atkinson, Adventures in Democracy; Steve McLeod, ‘Did Farmers Really “Lurch 
towards the Left” in 1935? Reassessing the Election of New Zealand’s First Labour Government’, in 
Miles Fairburn and Erik Olssen (eds.), Class, Gender and the Vote: Historical Perspectives from New 
Zealand (Otago: University of Otago Press, 2005); R.M. Chapman, W.K. Jackson and A.V. Mitchell 
(eds.), New Zealand Politics in Action: The 1960 General Election (London: Oxford University Press, 
1962); Miles Fairburn and Stephen Haslett, ‘The Rise of the Left and Working-Class Voting Behaviour 
in New Zealand: New Methods’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. xxxv, No. 4 (Spring 2005); 
Miles Fairburn and Stephen Haslett, ‘Cleavage within the Working Class? The Working-Class Vote for 
the Labour Party in New Zealand, 1911-51’, Labour History, Vol. 88 (May 2005); Alan Gamlen, ‘The 
Impacts of Extra-Territorial Voting: Swings, Interregnums and Feedback Effects in New Zealand 
Elections from 1914 to 2011’, in Political Geography, Vol. 44 (2015).  
10 Only Daniels deals with the subject in any depth in an appendix to his 1961 Masters thesis. There 
has, as Roberto Rabel has argued, been ‘little scholarly analysis’ of the ‘social and cultural dimensions 
of New Zealand’s war experience’ more generally. See Roberto Rabel, ‘New Zealand’s Wars’, in 
Giselle Byrnes (ed.), The New Oxford History of New Zealand (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
2009), p. 259. 
11 Elizabeth Kier and Ronald R. Krebs, ‘Introduction: War and Democracy in Comparative 
Perspective’ in Elizabeth Kier and Ronald R. Krebs (eds.), In War’s Wake: International Conflict and 
the Fate of Liberal Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 1-2; Elizabeth 
Kier, ‘War and Reform: Gaining Labor’s Compliance on the Homefront’, in Kier and Krebs (eds.), In 
War’s Wake, p. 139; Tony Judt, Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century 
(London: Penguin, 2008), pp. 8-12; Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-first Century (London: 
Belknap Press, 2114), p. 20, Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. 
12 See, for example, Kier and Krebs (eds.), In War’s Wake; Angus Calder, The People’s War: Britain 
1939-1945 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969); Harold L. Smith (ed.), War and Social Change: British 
Society in the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986); Ross McKibbin, 
Classes and Cultures: England 1918-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Indivar Kamtekar, 
‘A Different War Dance: State and Class in India 1939-1945’, Past and Present, Vol. 176, No. 1 
(2002). 
13 For some notable exceptions see, Albert Grundlingh, ‘The King’s Afrikaners? Enlistment and Ethnic 
Identity in the Union of South Africa’s Defence Force During the Second World War, 1939-45’, The 
Journal of African History, Vol. 40, Issue 3 (November, 1999); Gajendra Singh, The Testimonies of 
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 The failure to interrogate the impact of military personnel on social and political 
change in the twentieth century appears anomalous considering the central place 
occupied by the citizen soldier in the western democratic tradition.14 This significant 
historiographical omission may be as much a consequence of a dearth of sources and 
ready methodologies as it is of historical oversight. Shifts in attitudes and opinions on 
the home front over time, especially in the case of the Second World War, can be 
gauged through the use of polling data such as that produced by Gallup, or by 
reference to Mass Observation studies in the case of Britain and man-on-the-street 
studies in the United States.15 The opinions of the armed forces, for obvious security 
reasons, were typically not recorded in that manner. 16  Moreover, the results of 
elections, those events that provide the most definitive guide to shifting attitudes and 
mark measurable shifts in the path to political action, are, in the main, not broken 
down in a way that is amenable to differentiating the votes of armed forces personnel 
from those of the general public. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars: Between Self and Sepoy; Richard Vinen, National Service: 
Conscription in Britain 1945-1963; Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making 
of the Greatest Generation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Geoffrey Field, ‘“Civilians in 
Uniform”: Class and Politics in the British Armed Forces, 1939-1945’, International Labor and 
Working-Class History, No. 80, Fall 2011; James T. Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II Americans 
and the Age of Big Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). The few scholarly works that 
assess the impact of the soldiers’ attitudes and voting behaviours on political and social change 
include: J.A. Crang, ‘Politics on Parade: Army Education and the 1945 General Election’, History, Vol. 
81, Issue 262 (1996); F.D. Tothill, ‘The Soldiers’ Vote and Its Effect on the Outcome of the South 
African General Election of 1943’, South African Historical Journal, Vol. 21 (1989); F.D. Tothill, ‘The 
1943 General Election’, Masters Thesis University of South Africa (1987); Daniels, ‘The General 
Election of 1943’; J.L. Granatstein, ‘The Armed Forces’ Vote in Canadian General Elections, 1940-
1968’, The Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (February 1969); Guy Grossman, Devorah 
Manekin and Dan Miodownik, ‘The Political Legacies of Combat: Attitudes Toward War and Peace 
Among Israeli Ex-Combatants’, International Organisation, Vol. 69, Issue 4 (September 2015). 
14 Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: Routledge, 1983); Peter Paret 
(ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986). 
15 Sparrow, Warfare State, pp. 55-9. 
16 The best known works on opinions in the US Army are Samuel. A Stouffer et al., The American 
Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath, Volume II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949) and S.L.A. 
Marshal, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (Gloucester, 1978). 
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This paper aims to take a step towards filling this gap in the historiography by 
making use of three categories of unexplored and under-explored sources. To begin 
with, a statistically robust social class profile of the Second New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force (2NZEF) in the Second World War is compiled. Such 
information is ‘usually considered essential’ to understanding voting behaviours and 
social change.17 The New Zealand Defence Forces Headquarters library in Wellington 
New Zealand houses a detailed list of the names, rank, unit, conjugal status, place of 
enlistment, address, details of next-of-kin and occupation of the 113,847 men who 
embarked from New Zealand to fight in the Middle East and the Mediterranean 
theatres of the war between 1940 and 1945. 18  The detailed list of occupations 
contained in these rolls allows the compilation of a social class profile of the 2NZEF 
(the first as far as this author is aware on any army in the Second World War).  
 
By utilising reports based on the censorship of soldiers’ mail, the paper also 
explores in depth the hopes, aspirations and political views of the 2NZEF.19 These 
sources can be found in archives in New Zealand, Australia and South Africa; 101 
weekly and biweekly reports, covering the period 13 June 1941 to 25 January 1944, 
survive from the period when the 2NZEF served in the Middle East;20 a further 104 
                                                        
17 Olssen and Hickey, Class and Occupation: The New Zealand Reality (Dunedin: Otago University 
Press, 2005), p. 9. 
18 Defence Library, New Zealand Defence Force, Nominal Rolls 1-15, Second New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force, 1940 to 1945. Some men would have embarked on a number of occasions. 
19 The censorship summaries have been used by J. L. Scoullar, Battle for Egypt: The Summer of 1942. 
Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-1945 (Wellington, 1955); John 
McLeod, Myth and Reality: The New Zealand Soldier in World War II (Auckland, 1986); Jonathan 
Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El 
Alamein (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Jonathan Fennell, ‘In Search of the ‘X’ Factor: Morale 
and the Study of Strategy’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 37, Nos. 6-7 (2014); Jonathan Fennell, 
‘Air Power and Morale in the North African Campaign of the Second World War’, Air Power Review, 
Vol. 15, No. 2 (2012); Jonathan Fennell, ‘“Steel my soldiers’ hearts”: El Alamein Reappraised’, 
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2011). 
20 South African Defence Force (SADF) Army Intelligence (AI) Group (Gp) 1 Box 43 Censorship 
Summaries Troops in Egypt, 1941 Parts 1 & 2; Australian War Memorial (AWM) 54 883/2/97 Part 1: 
Middle East Field Censorship: Part 1, Summary of British Troops in Egypt and Libya 1941; AWM 54 
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weekly censorship reports were collated in Italy, between November 1943 and 
October 1945.21 These reports were compiled from the examination of about 2,000 
letters sent every week, or 10,000 letters every month, representing roughly 7 per cent 
of the total number of letters sent home by New Zealand soldiers during the war.22 
The reports describe in detail the attitudes and state of morale of the 2NZEF; they 
cover issues widely and deeply, only expressing views that represented a considerable 
body of opinion among troops, not isolated instances of over-exuberance or ill-
temper.23 They, therefore, provide a reliable documented insight into the concerns of 
the 2NZEF and arguably rank alongside sources such as Gallop Polls and Mass 
Observation studies in terms of their significance to historians of social and political 
change in the Twentieth Century.  
 
As well as the nominal rolls and censorship summaries, a third under-used 
source is examined in this paper, the detailed returns showing the number of votes 
recorded for each candidate at each polling-place in the 25th New Zealand general 
                                                                                                                                                              
883/2/97 Part 2: Weekly Summary, British Troops in Egypt and Libya, January to June 1942; Archives 
New Zealand (ANZ) WAII/1/DA508/1 Volumes 1, 2 3 & 4 Censorship Summaries, 1942 to 1944. The 
summaries for 9 to 16 December 1941 and 29 December 1943 to 11 January 1944 were not available in 
the archives. 
21 ANZ WAII/1/DA508/3 1 & 2 NZ Field Censor Section Weekly Reports, 1943, 1944, 1945. Due to 
reorganisation of the censorship apparatus, two reports were compiled each week between the weeks 
ending 2 August 1945 and 6 September 1945. An additional 44 bi-weekly censorship reports were 
produced as part of the Central Mediterranean Force biweekly censorship reporting apparatus 
(November 1943 to September 1944). These reports summarised the information from the weekly 
summaries and were passed on to the War Office, Allied Forces HQ, HQ Allied Armies in Italy and 
GHQ Middle East. See National Archives (NA) War Office (WO) 204/10381 Appreciation and 
Censorship Reports: Nos. 1 to 52, 30 November 1942 to 15 September 1944; NA WO 204 10382 
Appreciation and Censorship Reports: Nos. 53-77, September 1944 to September 1945. 
22 ANZ WAII/1/DA 302/15/1-31 History 1 and 2 NZ Field Censor Sections, pp. 35-54; ANZ 
WAII/1/DA508/3 1 & 2 NZ Field Censor Section Weekly Reports, 1943, 1944, 1945. The weekly 
reports in Italy were compiled from the censorship of 237,792 air letter cards, airgraphs, green 
envelopes and ordinary letters.  
23 AWM 54 883/2/97 Middle East Field Censorship Weekly Summary (MEFCWS), No. I (12 to 18 
November 1941), p. 1.  
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election of September 1943.24 Throughout the war, those armies that were called on to 
defend democracy were also periodically required to partake in it. Due to the 
exigencies of a world war, troops were often overseas during these periods and 
enormous efforts were made to ensure that citizen soldiers were given the opportunity 
to vote. In the case of the 1943 New Zealand general election, serving military 
personnel voted in New Zealand, Canada, England, the Middle East and the Pacific. 
The number of votes cast in each of these locations for each candidate in each 
constituency was recorded and presented to both houses of the New Zealand General 
Assembly in 1944. This source offers historians one of very few opportunities to gain 
an insight into the military as opposed to the civilian franchise at a key moment in the 
political and social evolution of a country.25  
 
. . . . . 
 
New Zealand entered the Second World War having experienced a truly dramatic, and 
at times traumatic, 1920s and 30s. The prosperity expected after the First World War 
‘did not materialise’.26 During the 1920s, New Zealand sent on average at least 75 per 
cent of its exports to, and bought 50 per cent of its imports from, Britain. Thus, 
fluctuations in overseas demand hit New Zealand hard. With the onset of the 
Depression, export income nearly halved. The Conservative Government (a coalition 
                                                        
24 Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1944 Session I, H-33a; ANZ 
WAII/1/DA565/1 Major W.A. Bryan, Report on the Conduct of the 1943 General Election in the 
Middle East. 
25 See, for example, Crang, ‘Politics on Parade’, History, Vol. 81, Issue 262 (1996); Tothill, ‘The 
Soldiers’ Vote and Its Effect on the Outcome of the South African General Election of 1943’, South 
African Historical Journal, Vol. 21 (1989); Granatstein, ‘The Armed Forces’ Vote in Canadian 
General Elections’, The Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (February 1969); Grossman, 
Manekin and Miodownik, ‘The Political Legacies of Combat’, International Organisation, Vol. 69, 
Issue 4 (September 2015); Jonathan W. White, Emancipation: The Union Army and the Reelection of 
Abraham Lincoln (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014). 
26 Philippa Mein Smith, A Concise History of New Zealand (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), p. 146. 
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between the United Party and the Reform Party) slashed expenditure, provoking anger 
at its ‘seeming indifference to the needs of ordinary people’. ‘The principle of “no pay 
without work”’ (there was no payment of a ‘dole’) ‘led to massive public works 
schemes’. The government ‘laid off staff and re-employed them at relief rates. 
Arbitration in industrial disputes and union membership ceased to be compulsory’, 
giving more power to employers.27 
 
In the worst of the crisis, some cohorts of the male population (the Maori) suffered 
40 per cent unemployment.  More generally, unemployment fluctuated between 12 to 
15 per cent for the depression years. This level of unemployment ‘overwhelmed 
charities and charitable aid boards’, etching the image of ‘the soup kitchen in popular 
memory’.28 Although the experience of the Depression was varied, on the whole it did 
seem to align along class and occupational boundaries;29 this ‘left a gulf between the 
unemployed and the employed, between workers – especially casual labour – and the 
privileged’ and the gap between rich and poor widened.30 
 
Politics during the inter-war years, much as was the case elsewhere in the 
Commonwealth, was dominated by conservative parties. In the 1920s, Labour gained 
some traction in the cities but mostly failed to garner mainstream support ‘until it 
abandoned its platform of socialisation, especially the nationalisation of land’.31 The 
turning point came with the Depression and in November 1935 Labour, led by 
Michael J. Savage, won a landslide victory. The Labour Party’s election manifesto 
                                                        
27 Ibid, pp. 142-51; Margaret McClure, A Civilised Community: A History of Social Security in New 
Zealand, 1898-1998 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), p. 49. 
28 Ibid., pp. 151-3. 
29 Tom Brooking, ‘Economic Transformation’, in Geoffrey W. Rice (ed.), The Oxford History of New 
Zealand (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 251. 
30 Mein Smith, A Concise History of New Zealand, p. 152. 
31 Ibid., p. 146. 
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promised to use the ‘wonderful resources of the Dominion’ to restore ‘a decent living 
standard’ to those who had ‘been deprived of essentials for the past five years’. It 
pledged to restructure the economy and to secure a comfortable standard of living for 
all.32 
 
The new Labour government believed that by increasing the purchasing power of 
the ordinary New Zealander, through state intervention in the economy and benefits, 
it would boost growth, and, as Philippa Mein Smith has argued, ‘it did’. Recovery 
from depression was ‘unusually fast’ and by 1938 real GDP per capita had risen by a 
third.33 Unemployment remained stubbornly high;34 nevertheless, Labour managed to 
change the narrative. It succeeded in closing the gap between rich and poor and 
through intervention in the economy, reforms to pensions, healthcare and 
unemployment benefits, culminating in the Social Security Act of 1938, a true social 
citizenship was born.35  
 
In language that would be echoed in the more radical aspects of US President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s four freedoms,36 Walter Nash, Minister of Finance, argued 
that, 
 
There is and can be no freedom in any real sense of the term so long as a large 
proportion of the population is perpetually faced with the fear of economic and 
social insecurity. What freedom did the unemployed have, under the last 
                                                        
32 Ibid., pp. 155. 
33 Ibid., pp. 154-6; McClure, A Civilised Community, pp. 48-93; Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes 
the Song, p. 160. 
34 Brooking, ‘Economic Transformation’, in Rice (ed.), The Oxford History of New Zealand, p. 251. 
35 McClure, A Civilised Community, pp. 48-93. 
36 Sparrow, Warfare State, pp. 43-6. Roosevelt’s four freedoms were freedom of speech, freedom of 
worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. 
 11 
government, to bring up a healthy and happy family? How free were the invalids 
who had to depend for their livelihood on the charity of others? How much liberty 
did the old people enjoy – trying to eke out a miserable existence on 17s 6d a 
week? Did the widows and the orphans and the sick appreciate the wonderful 
heritage of freedom and liberty bequeathed to them? ‘Freedom’ … to the Labour 
Party … involves above all else the right to enjoy the necessities of life and the 
amenities of a decent, civilised existence.37 
 
By 1939, it was apparent that New Zealand was firmly on the path towards building a 
progressive society where ordinary people were protected from the inherent 
uncertainty of the market and freed from anxieties and hardships caused by 
circumstances over which they had little control.38 
 
The new ‘social contract’ championed by the Labour Party after its election victory 
in 1935 came under sustained pressure on the outbreak of the Second World War. 
Both Fraser, who became the new Labour Prime Minister after Savage’s death in 
March 1940,39 and Nash ‘saw the successful conduct of war as the primary goal of the 
government’. In Fraser’s first address to the Labour Party Conference as Prime 
Minister, in April 1941, he advocated patience and sacrifice for the duration of the 
conflict, and pledged the reward of social reconstruction to follow. The ambition of 
Labour to remove extremes of wealth and poverty should be left ‘in abeyance’, he 
declared, for ‘if the Nazis win we lose everything, and instead of remaining free men 
                                                        
37 Quoted in McClure, A Civilised Community, p. 60. 
38 McClure, A Civilised Community, p. 83; Margaret Galt, ‘Wealth and income in New Zealand, c.1870 
to c.1939’, PhD thesis, Victoria (1985); Mein Smith, A Concise History of New Zealand, p. 124. 
39 Martin, The House, p. 212. 
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we become nothing more nor less than the slaves of a foreign ruling class’. 40 Plans 
for the implementation of universal superannuation, as laid out in the 1938 Social 
Security Act, were ‘whittled down in size, and the final outcome was a token 
superannuation. The minimal rate of about four shillings a week (16s 8d a month) was 
too small to distribute in fortnightly payments and was paid in three-monthly amounts 
to make its insignificance less obvious’.41  
 
To prevent inflation, Labour carried out a strict policy of stabilisation of prices and 
wages, gaining the support of trade unions to check workers’ demands for wage rises. 
To compensate for ‘the tight rein on wage levels’ and the effects of additional war 
taxation, family benefits were raised. However, family benefits were means tested. ‘If 
men worked long hours on farms or in factories, or mothers joined the workforce, and 
parents together earned more than the £5 weekly income limit, their family benefit 
was reduced pound for pound of earnings’. Workers were ‘better off if they refused 
long hours or weekend work’ and it ‘became clear that the means test on family 
benefits was a barrier to full production’. As a consequence, the hopes of the 
government to ‘obtain longer hours of work from the one-fifth of New Zealand 
families receiving the benefit were stalled’.42 
 
Workers protested against the means-test and the loss of family benefit, but, 
ironically, at least at the beginning of the war, ‘workers’ confidence’ in New 
Zealand’s Labour party guaranteed the Government more leeway than that enjoyed by 
administrations in other Allied countries. British unions, for example, ‘were far more 
                                                        
40 Quoted in McClure, A Civilised Community, p. 95; See also, Daniels, ‘The General Election of 
1943’, p. 240. 
41 McClure, A Civilised Community, p. 96. 
42 Ibid., pp. 97-8. 
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suspicious of their government enlarging wage packets through a family or 
motherhood allowance, and strongly opposed these supplements as a replacement for 
wage increases’. 43  The production boom in the United States was built on the 
widespread support of labour, influenced by significantly increased wages and the 
ready availability of overtime.44 
 
As the war progressed, the uneasy truce on the home front in New Zealand 
began to deteriorate. Labour had promised to avoid conflict about equality during the 
war; powers to conscript wealth were to equal those to conscript men. However, in 
reality, big business was booming while the standard of living of the ordinary worker 
was broadly stagnant; ‘businessmen and manufacturers had guaranteed markets, sure 
sales, a disciplined labour force with set wages and conditions, and price margins 
which provided uninterrupted profitability, capital growth, and resources for further 
investment’.45 By comparison, for the working class, opportunities ‘to be upwardly 
mobile were poor … and even sagged under the … Labour government’.46 This led to 
widespread strikes. In 1940, 28,100 working days were lost to strikes. In 1941, 26,200 
were lost and in 1942, 51,200. The six years of the war (1940 to 1945) saw a 45 per 
cent increase in days lost to strike action compared with the six years preceding the 
conflict.47  
 
                                                        
43 Ibid., p. 97. 
44 Sparrow, Warfare State, pp. 113-17, 166. 
45 Robert Chapman, ‘From Labour to National’, in Rice (ed.),  The Oxford History of New Zealand, 
pp. 367-8; Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, pp. 171, 200-1. 
46 Miles Fairburn and S.J. Haslett, ‘Stability and Egalitarians: New Zealand, 1911-1951’, in Miles 
Fairburn and Erik Olssen (eds.), Class, Gender and the Vote: Historical Perspectives from New 
Zealand (Otago: University of Otago Press, 2005), p. 25. 
47 G.T. Bloomfield, New Zealand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 
1984), p. 148.  
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It was apparent that Labour, in its desire to create a national war effort, was 
placing a disproportionate burden on the very constituency that had delivered it 
power. The parliamentary Labour Party was critical of this approach. An editorial in 
Standard noted, for example, that 
 
Labour has never sought power by making a compact with its political enemies. It 
will not now yield its power to them. Labour was elected Government of this 
country by the largest vote ever accorded one party in the history of the country. It 
has a tremendous majority in the House of Parliament. It can make its decisions 
and carry them out without reference to any other group.48 
 
Fraser, by comparison, wished to maintain a ‘degree of flexibility’ in his dealings 
with industry and the political right in New Zealand.49 Events forced Labour’s hand. 
With the fall of France in June 1940, public opinion demanded national unity and on 
16 July, Fraser announced the formation of a two-party War Cabinet made up of three 
Labour (Fraser, Nash, and Frederick Jones, the Minister of Defence) and two National 
representatives (Adam Hamilton, the leader of the National Party, and the former 
Prime Minster, Gordon Coates). In a constitutionally anomalous arrangement that 
reflected the split in the Labour Party over how to manage the war effort, New 
Zealand would have two cabinets; one, a War Cabinet, including the National 
representatives, would take major war related decisions, and another, a regular Labour 
Cabinet, would run domestic affairs.50 
 
                                                        
48 Daniels, ‘The General Election of 1943’, p. 11. The editorial was published in March 1941. 
49 Daniels, ‘The General Election of 1943’, p. 11; Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 
230. 
50 Guy H. Scholefield, New Zealand Parliamentary Record, 1840-1949 (Wellington: R.E. Owen, 
1950), p. 52; Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 197. 
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This arrangement pleased few. The Labour Party, in spite of Fraser’s efforts, 
remained opposed to a national government.51 The National Party was so unimpressed 
that it removed its leader, Hamilton, and replaced him with Sidney Holland, who 
declined to take a seat in the War Cabinet that November (Hamilton and Coates 
remained in their posts regardless).52 With the fall of Singapore in February 1942, the 
stakes became even higher. The war was now a direct threat to New Zealand and with 
increasing strikes and industrial unrest, Fraser turned again to National. Fraser 
realised, in this time of national crisis, that he could not contain the demands of 
unions who fully expected the Labour government to support them against 
management, and viewed the refusal of Labour to do so as a betrayal. Strikes on the 
home front highlighted the ‘glaring contrast’ between those ‘who, to a greater or 
lesser extent, were inflicting loss on the community in pursuit of sectional advantage’, 
and the servicemen ‘who had volunteered or been conscripted into risking their lives 
for the common interest’. According to F.L.W. Wood, the ‘problem of maintaining 
industrial discipline’ became ‘worse than embarrassing for the Government’.53 
 
That June, a new War Administration was set up, including seven Labour and six 
National Ministers. The new arrangement, however, was ‘as a constitutional device 
even more anomalous than its predecessor’. In order to ensure that all the Labour 
ministers kept their portfolios and that each National minister was responsible for 
some aspect of the direction of the war, considerable overlap of responsibilities was 
accepted. For example, Labour’s Jones remained Minister of Defence while the 
former Prime Minister and opposition Member of Parliament Coates became Minister 
                                                        
51 Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 230. 
52 Daniels, ‘The General Election of 1943’, pp. 7-10; Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 
198. 
53 Wood, Political and External Affairs, pp. 229-30 and 241-2. 
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of Armed Forces and War Co-ordination. As if to highlight the ad hoc nature of the 
agreement, the existing domestic cabinet remained in place.54 
 
A coherent and straightforward vision for the management of the New Zealand war 
effort did not materialise that summer. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the new War 
Administration lasted only until October, when a dispute at the Huntly mines 
highlighted the fundamental frictions and competing interests inherent in the deal. 
The standoff threatened to escalate into a national strike involving 1,200 miners. With 
Fraser in the United States, the new War Cabinet authorised legal proceedings against 
the miners (through the Strike and Lockout Emergency Regulations). Holland, deputy 
chairman of the War Cabinet and Leader of the Opposition, stated that, 
 
This is a time for the strongest action . . . There can be no thought of any 
arrangement that interferes with the processes of the law by which those who break 
it are punished . . . The question of who is to rule this country must be settled once 
and for all. 55 
 
This, surely, was exactly what National had been co-opted into the War 
Administration to do. However, on return to New Zealand, Fraser supported a very 
different course of action to that agreed in his absence. On 21 September, he 
recommended to a joint meeting of the War Administration and domestic cabinet that 
the mines should be taken under state control, the prosecution of the miners be 
cancelled and that the owners of the mine should be paid a return on their capital for 
                                                        
54 Ibid., pp. 230-3; Guy H. Scholefield, New Zealand Parliamentary Record, 1840-1949 (Wellington: 
R.E. Owen, 1950), p. 50; Martin, The House, p. 214; Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 
230. 
55 Wood, Political and External Affairs, p. 235; Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 231. 
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the rest of the war. This was completely unacceptable to Holland, who advocated that 
the ring-leaders be imprisoned and the rest given forty-eight hours to get back to work 
or be drafted into the army. National decided to withdraw from the War 
Administration and in early October the six National Party members duly resigned. 
Fraser had neither guaranteed a truly egalitarian distribution of wartime sacrifices nor 
demonstrated the will to control labour when it predictably revolted. He admitted in 
parliament that ‘the basis of unity in the country’ had ‘been destroyed – irretrievably 
destroyed’, there could ‘be no trust between the two parties now’. ‘The best solution’, 
according to Holland, was to hold an election ‘as soon as’ the war situation 
permitted.56 
 
. . . . . 
 
It would be eleven long months before ‘the war situation permitted’ an election in 
New Zealand, with the votes of service personnel proving decisive to the Labour 
victory. ‘The most obvious starting point’ for investigating why the forces voted so 
overwhelmingly for Labour when the polls opened in September 1943 is the ‘socio-
economic profile’ of the cohort.57 Indeed, a hypothesis that the New Zealand armed 
forces of the Second World War were predominantly made up of a group of men 
likely to vote for a party with working class interests (Labour) does not seem 
                                                        
56 Wood, Political and External Affairs, pp. 236-9; Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 
232. 
57 Richard Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2004), p. 274. 
While political scientists recognise that no ‘single theory of political motivation’ can capture the 
complexity of voting behaviour, it is apparent that voters are subject to a variety of standard influences; 
there are long-term social factors, such as class and family background, ‘as well as more immediate 
effects’, including situational factors, like, for example, ‘perceptions about the prime minister and the 
government of the day or about the policies of the competing parties’. 
 18 
unreasonable.58 In the First World War, the call-up system, as it operated in Britain, 
put a disproportionate strain on certain segments of society, especially skilled 
working class and lower middle-class men.59 Studies on conscription in New Zealand 
in the First World War point to a similar dynamic.60  
 
To date, however, only one study has attempted to gauge the social class 
composition of a cohort of the New Zealand Army in the Second World War. John 
McLeod’s revisionist work, Myth and Reality: The New Zealand Soldier in World 
War II, used a sample of 800 officers as evidence that appointments to leadership 
positions in the 2NZEF became more progressive over the course of the war. 
McLeod’s approach was highly innovative, but his sample was not large enough to be 
conclusively representative; nor did it adequately encompass the class composition of 
Other Ranks (ORs) in the 2NZEF. Perhaps more importantly, it did not engage in 
comparisons with New Zealand society more generally.61 
 
This study builds on McLeod’s work to provide the first comprehensive and 
statistically robust social class survey of the New Zealand Army (and as far as this 
author is aware, any army) in the Second World War. Unlike most major developed 
countries, there is a distinct absence of consistent census data and scholarly literature 
                                                        
58 Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, p. 177. In an appendix to his 1961 Masters thesis, 
Daniels also argued that the forces vote was a product of the men’s social class background. See 
Daniels, ‘The General Election of 1943’, pp. 339-41. See also e.g. R. Anderson, ‘Class Matters: The 
Persisting Effects of Contextual Social Class on Individual Voting in Britain, 1964–97’, European 
Sociological Review, Vol. 18. No. 2 (2002), pp. 125-138. 
59 Adrian Gregory, The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 81 and 317. 
60 David Littlewood, ‘“Should He Serve”?: The Military Service Boards’ Operations in the Wellington 
Provincial District, 1916-1918’  (Masters Thesis, Massey University, 2010), pp. 55-74. 
61 McLeod, Myth and Reality, pp. 156-69. The study did show the percentage of Others Ranks with the 
occupations of solicitor, teacher, shop assistant and labourer in the first three echelons of 2NZEF. For 
works on the class and occupational structure of New Zealand, see Fairburn and Olssen (eds.), Class, 
Gender and the Vote; Erik Olssen and Maureen Hickey, Class and Occupation: The New Zealand 
Reality (Dunedin: Otago University Press, 2005). 
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on occupations and occupational structure in New Zealand.62 This matters, as the 
usual method for ascertaining social class categorises groups based on their position 
in a graded hierarchy of occupations.63 As Erik Olssen and Maureen Hickey put it, in 
industrial societies, 
 
Ideas about careers and occupations fused in complex ways to constitute 
occupation as a dimension of identity. Occupation also became the key 
determinant of the work one did, the pay or income one got, the quality of house 
one lived in and where it was situated, the level of risk of accident or illness, and 
one’s life chances generally.64 
 
Unfortunately, the 1945 New Zealand census did not provide a social class 
breakdown by occupation; in fact, it wasn’t until 1972 that W. Elley and J. Irving 
produced an occupational index, allowing scholars to make comparisons between 
population sub-sets and the population in general in New Zealand.65 Elley and Irving 
                                                        
62 Melanie Nolan, ‘Constantly On The Move, But Going Nowhere? Work, Community and Social 
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63 David Rose, ‘Official Social Classifications in the UK’, Social Research Update, Issue 9 (July 
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64 Olssen and Hickey, Class and Occupation, p. 13. 
65 W.B. Elley and J.C. Irving, ‘A Socio-Economic Index for New Zealand Based on Levels of 
Education and Income from the 1966 Census’, New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 7, 
No. 2 (1972), p. 154. Elley and Irving used the median level of education and income reported for each 
occupation in the 1966 census combined, with equal weight, to arrive at their index of the status of 
each occupation. They later revised their scale to incorporate the International Standard Classification 
of Occupation which the New Zealand Census first used in 1971 (see W.B. Elley and J.C. Irving, 
‘Revised Socio-economic index for New Zealand’, New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 
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segmented New Zealand society into six ‘levels’, or classes: level 1 included, for 
example, accountants, doctors, lawyers and university teachers; level 2 included bank 
managers, clergymen, artists, company directors and farmers; level 3 included 
bookkeepers, clerks, laboratory technicians and policemen; level 4, builders, 
fishermen, mechanics and electricians; level 5, blacksmiths, bus and truck drivers, 
textile and other factory workers; and level 6, farm and general labourers, janitors and 
miners.66 
 
To gauge the proportion of the army in each occupation grouping or social class in 
New Zealand, it was decided to cross reference data on the occupational background 
of the 2NZEF, contained in the nominal rolls of 2NZEF embarkations from New 
Zealand, with the social class category classifications from the study of Elley and 
Irving.67 The occupational background of the 2NZEF was derived from a probability 
sample of embarkations, where each of the 113,847 men who embarked from New 
Zealand had an equal chance of being chosen.68 The embarkation rolls were already 
organised alphabetically and the individuals selected for the sample were picked on a 
systematic basis i.e. one name was chosen from the middle of every second or third 
page of the embarkation rolls depending on the number of names on the page. When 
the individual’s occupation was ascertained it was then assigned to a class category 
using the Elley and Irving classification. The total sample size was 1,244; thus at a 95 
per cent confidence level there was a sample error of ±2.8 per cent.  
                                                                                                                                                              
11, No. 1 (1976), pp. 25-36).  The Elley and Irving classification is still widely used by researchers (see 
Olssen and Hickey, Class and Occupation, pp. 31-2 and 259.  
66 Elley and Irving, ‘A Socio-Economic Index for New Zealand’, pp. 161-2.  
67 The nominal rolls, 15 in total, contain information on the occupation of each embarkee, of every 
rank. They are housed in the Ministry of Defence Headquarters Library in Wellington, New Zealand. A 
more recent study by Olssen and Hickey, Class and Occupation, provides a detailed breakdown of the 
urban occupational structure of New Zealand in 1936. The work, however, does not provide a 
breakdown for rural occupations, and, therefore, was considered unsuitable for comparisons with a 
cohort that contained a considerable proportion of individuals with rural occupations. 
68 Some men would have embarked on a number of occasions. 
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As the 1945 census did not include social class categories, it was not possible to 
directly compare the 2NZEF social class composition with a contemporary social 
class breakdown of the New Zealand population. The 1966 census data on 
occupations grouped into classes by Elley and Irving is the earliest acceptable social 
class categorization; thus it was used as a proxy for the 1945 New Zealand national 
social class profile. There is, therefore, a twenty-one year gap between the Army 
sample and the analysis of the general population. Nevertheless, the social class 
composition of societies tends to change at a sufficiently gradual rate to make 
comparisons meaningful.69  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table One: The 2NZEF by Social Class.70 
 
 
The results show that the 2NZEF had a disproportionately small percentage 
(14.8 per cent) of the professional classes, levels I and II, as compared to the 
population at large (25.1 per cent). Skilled workers, level IV, were also under-
                                                        
69 Elley and Irving, ‘A Socio-Economic Index for New Zealand’, p. 159. 
70 Elley and Irving, ‘A Socio-Economic Index for New Zealand’, p. 159; Defence Library, New 
Zealand Defence Force, Nominal Rolls 1-15, Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force, 1940 to 1945. 
Elley and Irving did not name their different levels (or classes), but the terms ‘higher professional’, 
‘lower professional’, ‘clerical & highly skilled’, ‘skilled’, ‘semi-skilled’ and ‘unskilled’ seem 
appropriate given the occupations included in each level (or class).  
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represented (23.7 per cent, as opposed to 28.2 per cent). Unskilled workers, level VI, 
by comparison, were represented to a disproportionately high extent (25.5 per cent in 
the 2NZEF as compared to 12.1 per cent in the general population). It is evident that 
the 2NZEF was, therefore, of lower occupation status than the population at large. 
Accordingly, the Army would have been, it could be argued, more likely to vote for 
Labour than for the right of centre National Party in the 1943 general election.  
 
Detailed analysis of the forces vote, however, throws considerable doubt on 
this supposition. By aggregating the votes cast for each party from each military 
theatre in each constituency  (see Table Two), it is evident that a greater proportion of 
those stationed in England voted Labour than those stationed in other theatres, such as 
the Pacific and Middle East.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
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Table Two: Results of the 1943 New Zealand General Election: The Civilian and 
Forces Vote.71 
 
* The forces total includes 342 votes cast on the Chatham Islands and by the Mercantile Marine.72 
NZ=New Zealand; ME=Middle East. England includes a limited number of New Zealanders stationed 
in Greenland, Iceland and Gibraltar. 
 
The vast majority of the 3,110 voters in the UK were Air Force personnel, 
individuals who were likely to have been of a higher social class than the majority of 
those in the 2NZEF.73 Throughout the war, the British and Commonwealth armies 
continually struggled to find ‘good human material’ as the majority of the ‘best’ 
                                                        
71 Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1944 Session I, H-33a; ANZ 
WAII/1/DA565/1 Major W.A. Bryan, Report on the Conduct of the 1943 General Election in the 
Middle East. 
72 These were distributed: Labour 192 (56.14%), National, 115 (33.63%), Democratic Labour 14 
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73 H.L. Thompson, Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45: New 
Zealanders with the Royal Air Force, Vol. I (Wellington: Government Printers, 1953), p. 388. The New 
Zealand Defence HQ Library, ‘Report of the National Service Department, 1946’, p. 15, reported that 
in October 1944 there were 4,086 New Zealand Air Force personnel in the UK. There were also 1,676 
stationed in Canada. AJHR 1944 I H-33c, The General Election 1943, The Report of the Special 
Returning Officer in the United Kingdom, certainly gives the impression that the majority of voters 
were Air Force personnel. In December 1942, there were 5,085 New Zealanders serving with the RAF 
and based in the UK 
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intakes chose to join either the Royal Air Force (RAF) or the Royal Navy.74 Nominal 
rolls, such as those used for the 2NZEF, are unfortunately not available for the airmen 
who served with the RAF in the United Kingdom. However, there are several books 
that include biographical information about New Zealand airmen in the Second World 
War.75 Kenneth G. Wynn’s study of New Zealanders with the Battle of Britain Clasp, 
for example, gives details of the occupations of 120 of the 131 men who were 
awarded this honour by the Battle of Britain Fighter Association or the Royal New 
Zealand Air Force. 76  This sample, although clearly too small to be statistically 
representative, suggests what one might expect, that New Zealand airmen were of a 
higher social class than those in the 2NZEF generally (see Table Three).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
                                                        
74 Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign, p. 97; NA WO 163/123 Army No 72. 
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76 Wynn, A Clasp for ‘The Few’, pp. xi-xiii. 
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Table Three: New Zealanders with a Battle of Britain Clasp by Social Class.77 
 
 
These figures indicate that the cohort in the UK was overall of higher social 
status than the 2NZEF generally. But that cohort exhibited the highest level of support 
for Labour in their votes. The voting behaviour of the New Zealand forces in the UK 
does not, therefore, support the argument that social class background was a key 
factor in shaping the forces vote.  
 
Additionally, as there is no reason to believe that soldiers serving in New 
Zealand or the Pacific were of a different social class background to those in the 
Middle East, or that airmen serving in Canada were of a different social class 
background to those in the UK, social class can also be discounted as an explanation 
for the differences in their voting preferences. There appears, therefore, to be no clear 
association between the social class status of New Zealanders in the armed forces and 
their voting behaviours. This conclusion is consistent with recent research on the 
voting behaviour of the urban working class in New Zealand. Miles Fairburn and 
                                                        
77 Elley and Irving, ‘A Socio-Economic Index for New Zealand’; Wynn, A Clasp for ‘The Few’, pp. 1-
461.  
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Stephen Haslett have shown that the working class was by no means unfailingly 
inclined to vote for the left between 1911 and 1951.78 
 
It could be suggested that another factor played a role in the forces franchise, 
the situational influence arising from the soldiers’ distance from the main election 
campaign arena and the length of time they were absent from that arena. J.R.S. 
Daniels has argued, for example, that the troops serving abroad had been isolated for 
too long from the cut-and-thrust of domestic politics in New Zealand. As a 
consequence, they were more likely to have voted for what they knew, incumbent 
local Members of Parliament, and to have been unaffected by the general decline in 
support for Labour that took place on the home front.79 47 of the 80 constituencies in 
the 1943 general election were contested by Labour incumbents, and, indeed, 
incumbents were generally more likely to win on the day. 80  However, while the 
percentage vote received by Labour incumbents did increase broadly in line with 
distance from New Zealand,81 the vote for National incumbents did not.82 It follows 
then that the variation in voting patterns outlined in Table Two cannot be explained 
                                                        
78 Miles Fairburn and Stephen Haslett, ‘The Rise of the Left and Working-Class Voting 
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(Spring, 2005), pp. 542-6; Miles Fairburn and Stephen Haslett, ‘Cleavage Within the Working Class? 
The Working-Class Vote for the Labour Party in New Zealand, 1911-51’, Labour History, No. 88 
(May, 2005), p. 194.  
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by changing propensities of soldiers voting for what they knew (sitting incumbents) 
the farther from the home country that they were based.83  
 
Additionally, in the sources examined for this study, there is every indication 
that in the lead up to the election Labour were just as unpopular with the troops 
overseas as they were on the home front. Before the disaster in Crete, Members of 
Parliament, who were serving on the front line, warned Fraser ‘that the average 
soldier was disenchanted with the government’. 84  An overall assessment of the 
censorship summaries leaves the reader in little doubt that with strikes back home and 
continued concerns about the unequal sacrifices being made as part of the New 
Zealand war effort, the Government was unpopular to an extent well beyond standard 
military grousing.  It was anticipated that Labour would  ‘receive a shock’85 and ‘lose 
a number of seats’.86 An OR wrote at the end of August 1943, ‘the attitude seems to 
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84 Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, pp. 213-14. 
85 ANZ WAII/1/DA508/1 Vol 3 MEMCFS No. LVIII, 24 February to 9 March 1943, p. 21. 
86 ANZ WAII/1/DA508/1 Vol 3 MEMCFS No. LXXI, 25 August to 7 September 1943, p. 30. 
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be, anyone is better than them, the result being that many declare that they will vote 
for anyone in preference to Labour’.87  
 
Tours by several cabinet ministers to the Middle East before the election made 
little difference to this negative feeling among the troops. The Minister of Defence, 
Frederick Jones, for example, visited 2NZEF in March/April 1943. He did, according 
to one man, paint ‘a glorious picture of what would be done for us after the war was 
over. We will be given a bungalow, plenty of work and everything would be rosey 
[sic]. Wasn’t a bad political speech’. But, even this writer was sceptical that the 
promises made by Jones would be kept. On the whole, the visit, according to the 
censors, left units ‘in a bad mood, having disliked the Minister’s speech which had 
increased their disapproval of the N.Z. Govt. and the Yanks in N.Z., their worry about 
wives and girl friends, and their home sickness and war weariness’.88 
 
In many respects, National appeared a more credible option for the military 
vote. Fraser had strongly opposed conscription in the First World War and had spent 
twelve months in jail for sedition. Nash, the Minister of Finance, had been a 
‘Christian pacifist’. 89  By contrast, Holland had served in the war and gained a 
commission from the ranks before he was invalided home in 1917. He had lost his 
brother during the conflict. 90  So confident were National of their appeal among 
servicemen, that when the result of the soldiers’ vote was announced, they were 
convinced that there had been some sort of irregularity in the voting. This suspicion 
was reinforced when it became known that the used ballot papers in the Middle East 
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had been destroyed rather than returned to New Zealand as required by law. A Select 
Committee of the House was set up to inquire into the matter. It found that Major 
W.A. Bryan, the special returning officer sent out from New Zealand to conduct the 
poll, had approached the military authorities to have the papers returned to New 
Zealand, but had been told that no shipping space was available. Had the enemy been 
able to capture the material, the strength of the New Zealand forces in the Middle East 
would have been accurately known and its security endangered. It was, therefore, 
decided to burn all the election material, including the used ballot papers. The 
committee decided that though Bryan had committed ‘an error of judgement’, the 
episode was not in the least sinister.91 
 
. . . . . 
 
If the social class of the cohort polled or issues such as time away from and distance 
from New Zealand were not decisive to the forces vote, the question then arises 
whether another factor might have encouraged the forces to vote Labour in September 
1943. The pattern of voting across theatres and the censorship summaries, for 
instance, suggest that the attitudes of the forces were in many ways affected by the 
experience of the war itself and that it was this more immediate dynamic that 
impacted decisively on voting behaviour.  
 
As can be seen in Table Two, Labour’s share of the vote increased in line with 
one important aspect of the wartime experience, proximity to combat. Labour 
received 47 per cent of the civilian vote, 50 per cent of the vote of those military 
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personnel training in New Zealand, 52 per cent of the vote of those who had left New 
Zealand and were mostly training in the Air Force in Canada, 54 per cent of the vote 
from 3rd Division who had experienced minor operations in the Pacific and were now 
undergoing training at Guadalcanal, 56 per cent of the vote from 2nd Division who 
were recovering from major operations in the desert and Tunisia and preparing for the 
next phase of the war in Italy and 62 per cent of those serving in the UK, mostly Air 
Force personnel, who were ‘almost continuously engaged’ in highly hazardous 
bombing missions over the towns and factories of Europe.92  
 
The censorship summaries indicate that the war made soldiers more aware of 
the limits of individualism and the degree to which they were dependent on their 
fellow citizens for prosperity, security and wellbeing. Almost every aspect of the 
soldiers’ lives required cooperation, sharing and teamwork, the more so the closer to 
combat they got; extreme individualism or selfish behaviour was not only undesirable 
and inefficient but potentially life threatening. The censors, throughout the war, bore 
testimony to the ‘mutual trust, confidence and comradeship between all ranks’ in New 
Zealand units.93 As a sergeant wrote in December 1943, ‘the spirit of the troops is 
really great. We live with the same chaps month in and month out without contact 
with English speaking civilians . . . in the talks we have at night the view on all types 
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of subjects is most interesting’.94 Such comradeship was all the more powerful in 
battle, as ‘a stink’ as another man put it, could ‘do a lot to weld us together’.95  
 
Concepts of fairness and egalitarianism became deeply embedded in the 
2NZEF.96 As an OR wrote in May 1943, ‘all we want is a fair deal’.97 The troops 
railed against anything that smacked of privilege or ‘the old school tie’. 98 
Replacement officers arriving from New Zealand in 1943 had to revert to Non-
Commissioned Officer (NCO) rank upon arrival in the Middle East as it just would 
not have been fair for ‘a chap with tons of desert service’ to take orders from a 
‘rookie’.99 Those at the front were clearly confident that the very specific and extreme 
experience of ‘fighting side by side’ had changed opinions and would lead to ‘closer 
co-operation’ after the war;100 ‘We are all one big family’, a man in the 28th Maori 
Battalion wrote, ‘with no such thing as tribal differences. Each individual works not 
for the good of his tribe or Coy. [Company] but for the good of the … whole’.101 
 
The censorship summaries demonstrate that there was an overwhelming sense 
among the troops that gross inequalities and unfairness at home too had to be 
addressed, and it was the responsibility of the state (the Government) to do so.102 
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Equality of sacrifice was much more than a catch phrase; the men believed that they 
had the right to expect others to do as much as them. After all, they were fighting for 
a free, democratic and egalitarian society.103  
 
The manner in which the respective political parties addressed issues of 
fairness, social justice and the role of the state (‘big Government’) was, therefore, key 
to their support among the troops in the election. As much as elections can be a ballot 
on the performance of an incumbent, they are also about a vision for the future, and, 
in the case of the forces vote, a vision for which it had to be deemed worth fighting 
and perhaps dying.  
 
In the Middle East, a theatre that was broadly representative of how the 
election was fought in all the locations where New Zealand forces voted in 1943,104 
the men first heard of the probability of an election at the beginning of March 1943. 
The matter received ‘little interest’105, much as was the case on the home front,106 and 
the Government showed hardly any more; Fraser remarked early in the year that ‘I do 
not think that men in Egypt think about politics at all’.107 Perhaps as a consequence, 
there was little urgency in efforts made by the Government to organise the overseas 
forces vote. W.G. Stevens, the Officer in Charge of Administration in the 2NZEF, 
asked on two occasions (with little effect) for party policy statements to be sent to the 
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theatre, so that they would reach the troops at least three weeks before the election. 
Bryan, the special returning officer, only arrived in the Middle East with the 10th 
Reinforcement on 18 August. With his arrival, preparations began to gather pace. 
Bryan set about investigating the dispositions of the troops and put together a staff of 
22 clerks and typists, some with parliamentary experience, to record and count the 
vote. 108  104 polling stations were set up throughout theatre and all units were 
instructed to appoint a polling officer.109 
 
The soldiers’ newspaper, NZEF Times, began its election coverage on 2 
August and a week later it announced the date of the poll.  Even the local Egyptian 
newspapers gave the issue some attention. Posters presenting information regarding 
regulations, voting facilities and nominated candidates were ‘distributed liberally’ to 
all units of the 2NZEF, as well as to the New Zealand Forces Club, the New Zealand 
YMCA and all Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes (NAAFI). The NZEF Times 
repeatedly emphasised the soldiers’ ‘right’ and ‘duty’ to vote and encouraged the men 
to engage meaningfully with the election. However, with no information on party 
policies having arrived, and with Bryan having neglected to bring any election 
literature with him to the Middle East, Bernard Freyberg, the General Officer 
Commanding 2NZEF, who had stood as a Liberal Party candidate in Cardiff South in 
the UK in 1922, cabled the Government on 21 August urging that election material be 
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ready for distribution by 9 September, three days before the planned vote on 12 
September.110 
 
On 11 September, the New Zealand Division began to move to a new training 
area in preparation for its upcoming involvement in the Italian Campaign. The next 
day, it halted to carry out the voting. However, as information on the parties’ 
manifestos had still not arrived, Freyberg and Bryan decided to delay the vote; this 
was too late in the day to prevent the first 6,000 votes being cast.  
 
The election statements of the parties eventually arrived on 13 September and 
on 15 September they were released in the NZEF Times.111 Each party was given an 
allocation of space broadly in line with the number of seats that they were contesting, 
Labour 49 column inches, National 45, Democratic Labour 29, the Independent 
Group 23 and the Real Democracy Movement 6. The three sitting Independents, 
Harry Atmore, Bill Barnard and Herbert Kyle, were each allowed a 100-word 
message. These policy statements were printed in all the forces newspapers 
throughout the world and were distributed at around the same date in each theatre.112 
 
The Labour Party’s policy statement stressed what Labour had already done 
for soldiers and for their loved ones at home. Significantly, it also looked to the 
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future. It promised the ‘most generous war pension system in the world’. Employment 
would be guaranteed for all ex-servicemen. For those who wanted to study, there 
would be free or subsidised education. It was full of facts and figures, but, 
importantly, in the context of the soldiers’ experience of the war, one concept ran like 
a thread through the whole document, fairness. ‘Ex-servicemen and ex-
servicewomen’, pronounced the statement, ‘must come first in the national 
development because they have been first in the defence of our country and all that 
people cherish’. ‘What happened after 1914-18’ would ‘not happen again’.113  
 
The statement made great play of the Servicemen’s Settlement and Land Sales Act, 
which had been introduced in August just before the House rose. The legislation 
aimed to facilitate the settlement on the land of discharged servicemen at reasonable 
prices, and in general to prevent speculation in land or undue increases in prices.114 
According to Daniels, ‘pressure had been growing for some time for control of land 
values, which had risen spectacularly since 1939’. The failure of soldier settlement 
after the First World War had mainly been attributed to the high price of land. The 
Labour party argued that the Government had ‘to take strong action and get land at a 
fair price for soldiers’115 and that this would be best achieved by giving it power to 
take over land suitable for subdivision and by controlling the price of all land sales.116  
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Such policies resonated with the troops. The censorship summary for the 2NZEF 
in the Middle East, 8 to 21 September, showed that writers were ‘taking a deeper 
interest in post war problems’.117 A Padre wrote,  
 
I tried an experiment which proved very successful. On church parade I preached a 
rather controversial sermon on post war reconstruction and invited everybody in 
the evening to come to a kind of ‘open-forum’ debate in the hangar which is my 
recreational place. Well, when I strolled along there ten minutes before I had 
intended starting, the place was packed, there was hardly standing room . . . After a 
few preliminary remarks from me I invited one officer to give his idea of post war 
things from the financial point of view – this much was pre-arranged – and after 
that there was no holding them, chaps popped up and said their say about all sorts 
of things – but the chief topics were freehold or leasehold land and state housing. 
They were still going strong at 10.15 when I closed it for supper and at 11.30 when 
I went to put out the light, there was one group still arguing. Every tent seems to 
have become a debating society. 118 
 
The National Party, the press, farming groups, real-estate agents, chambers of 
commerce and the Law Society vehemently opposed the Servicemen’s Settlement and 
Land Sales Act. National complained that the Government was using the 
rehabilitation of servicemen as a cloak for pushing its socialistic schemes and that the 
act would operate unfairly against the holders of property in land or houses.119 Here 
lay the essential difference between the two parties. It was not that the National party 
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manifesto was devoid of its own narrative of fairness, but that the Labour manifesto 
clearly advocated fairness as it was understood by the troops.  
 
The National Party statement to the forces emphasised personal freedoms as an 
immutable principle and interest. It promised to give New Zealanders 
 
Freedom to live their own lives in their own way without bureaucratic dictation, to 
live in a system of competitive free enterprise, to own their own homes; freedom 
for our returning servicemen to follow the occupation of their choice without 
having to go cap in hand to the Government for a licence to earn a livelihood.120 
 
The weakness of this perspective, the Labour manifesto countered, was that the ‘old 
competitive style of market values’ championed by the Nationals really meant that the 
prosperity of ordinary citizens would be subject to the whims of ‘speculators’ and 
‘vested interests’, the ‘wolves of commerce’.  
 
In many other ways, the National Party policy statement echoed that of 
Labour. It promised to maintain wages and social services, and indeed to extend 
social security benefits. It pledged ‘jobs for all’ and to ‘remove the avoidable causes 
of want’.121 But, it was not the similarities in appeals that mattered to the troops, it 
was the underlying differences in ethos. It is clear from the censorship summaries that 
having seen and experienced the war, and the manner in which the state was able to 
mobilise its resources for destruction, the men believed that the state could also play a 
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positive role in a prosperous and fair peace, defined by the ideals and practice of 
social justice.122 
 
On 19 September, voting in the Middle East finally took place.123 The men 
cast their ballots overwhelmingly for Labour. They had been given very little time, 
only four days instead of the planned three weeks, to absorb the parties’ statements 
and reflect on their voting preferences.124 Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that, on 
the whole, what information was available was more than sufficient for the needs of 
the soldiers. By mid-August, the censors had already begun to note that ‘with the 
proximity of elections’ there was ‘more discussion’ about politics and the New 
Zealand Government.125 Those tasked with administering the forces vote certainly 
took the view that service personnel had been given enough time and information to 
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engage with the election and make reasoned use of their franchise. F.T. Sandford, the 
Special Returning Officer in the UK, noted that ‘I feel satisfied that those who did not 
register have not the excuse that they had not sufficient information’.126 The Special 
Returning Officer in the Pacific pointed out that in the circumstances the delivery of 
election material ‘could not have been done with greater promptitude’ and that in 
spite of all the difficulties experienced ‘the list of candidates was given every 
prominence in all places where troops assembled and was posted up in all polling-
booths’.127 
 
Bryan was convinced that the New Zealand forces in the Middle East had been 
‘election conscious’ and that they had shown a ‘considerable interest’ in the election 
process. This view is largely confirmed by a turnout figure of 88 per cent, a 
remarkable statistic in the circumstances and greater than the 83 per cent turnout by 
New Zealand civilians.128 Turnout was even more impressive in the Pacific where 97 
per cent of the ‘estimated voting strength of all services’ voted.129 In the UK, where 
the bulk of serving New Zealanders were in the Air Force, 75 per cent of those who 
registered voted; the ‘inclination to vote’ was, according to Sandford, ‘naturally not as 
keen as it would have been in units composed solely of fairly large numbers of New 
Zealanders’. 130  Of approximately 1,900 men entitled to vote in or near North 
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America, 1,443 voted, a turnout of 76 per cent.131 While, therefore, in some theatres 
the forces turnout was less than that of the civilians in New Zealand, it was still a very 
substantial participation in the democratic process under extraordinarily difficult 
conditions.132  
 
In the final analysis, it appears clear that the men had sufficient time to reflect 
and vote on the issues most relevant to them, the role of fairness, social justice and the 
state in society. The more actively engaged voters were in the war effort, the more 
important these issues became. A spirit of social cohesion had emerged from the 
exigencies of combat cohesion, with profound results for the future of New Zealand.  
 
. . . . . 
 
To conclude, the complexity behind the development of social citizenship in New 
Zealand has, as Margaret McClure has argued, been ‘concealed by accounts of the 
community’s consensus of support for the welfare state’.133 To this we might add the 
observation that ‘the main interest in the 1943 election’ should not be in its place in 
the ‘development of electoral trends in the nineteen-thirties and forties’, but in the 
‘culmination of political developments that were a direct result of the war’.134 The 
continuation of New Zealand’s great adventure in social citizenship in the twentieth 
century, which had been set in motion by Labour’s victory in 1935 and consolidated 
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in the 1938 Social Security Act, hinged to no small degree on the voting preferences 
of the cohort of citizens who fought in the Second World War. 
 
        In the early years of the war, Labour in New Zealand had echoed Churchill’s 
approach to the conflict more than that of Roosevelt in the United States. Churchill 
‘engaged little with domestic politics’ and saw debate about social change and 
reconstruction ‘as a distraction from his main task’.135 By contrast, Roosevelt sought 
to unite the domestic and martial elements of the war effort. In a radio broadcast on 
11 January 1944, he told the American people that ‘there is only one front. There is 
one line of unity which extends from the hearts of the people at home to the men of 
our attacking forces in our farthest outposts’. Roosevelt understood the need to garner 
widespread support for the war by engaging meaningfully with social conditions on 
the home front. By succeeding in this endeavour, he laid the foundations for victory 
on the battlefront and for four decades of ‘big Government’ in America.136 It is worth 
noting that Roosevelt won re-election in 1944; Churchill dramatically failed to do the 
same in 1945. 
 
           In New Zealand, Labour institutionalised a split between home and front by 
creating dual cabinets to administer the domestic and martial aspects of the war. It 
was only by figuratively promising in the 1943 Labour manifesto to renew the ‘social 
contract’, so powerfully encapsulated in the 1938 Social Security Act, that the party 
reconnected with the citizen-soldier and ultimately survived the election.  
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The Second World War clearly had, as so much of the historiography has 
shown, a considerable effect on civilians. But, it also profoundly affected those 
serving on the front line. Active engagement in the war effort fostered communitarian 
and egalitarian attitudes that were to impact greatly on voting preferences. The 
censorship summaries show that the men wrote about and were deeply concerned by 
issues such as social security, socialism, lack of control over profiteering, rights and 
class.137 The basic expectation was that the men, the home front and the state would 
all ‘pull together’.138 In December 1943, as the men wrote home after the receipt of 
mail from New Zealand covering the period of the election campaign, it was clear to 
the censors that the ‘large majority’ appeared to ‘approve of the re-election of the 
Labour Govt.’. An officer wrote, capturing the mood of the men,  
 
The Labour Members may not be ‘gentlemen’, they are rather working men; 
honest and vigorous, but their policy, before and during the war, has made little 
NZ one of the most respected and envied countries in the world. Sir William 
Beveridge acknowledges the debt of his much lauded plan to the Social Security 
Scheme of the Labour Party … All in all they are the only party with a definite 
progressive policy.139  
 
                                                        
137 ANZ WAII/1/DA508/1 Vol 3 & 4 MEMCFS No. L 4 to 17 November 1942, p. 18; ANZ 
WAII/1/DA508/1 Vol 3 & 4 MEMCFS No. LXVII, 30 June to 13 July 1943, p. 24; ANZ 
WAII/1/DA508/1 Vol 3 & 4 MEMCFS No. LXXVI, 3 to 16 November 1943, p. 23; ANZ 
WAII/1/DA508/1 Vol 3 & 4 MEMCFS No. LXXVII 17 to 30 November 1943, p. 22; ANZ 
WAII/1/DA508/1 Vol 3 & 4 MEMCFS No. LXXXI, 12 to 25 January 1944. 
138 ANZ WAII/1/DA508/1 Vol 4 MEMCFS No. LVIII, 24 February to 9 March 1943, p. 21. 
139 NA WO 204/10381 CMF and BNAF, Appreciation and Censorship Report No. 35, 16 to 31 
December 1943, p. C3; ANZ WAII/1/DA508/3 2 NZ Field Censor Section Weekly Report No. 4, 13 to 
18 December 1943, Part II, p. 2. The success of Democratic Labour, which stood to the Left of the 
Labour party, can be explained in a similar light. It championed a comparable set of social and 
economic policies to Labour, but with the added carrot of a ticket home to New Zealand. Its manifesto 
stated: ‘We believe the Middle East forces should be returned to New Zealand for a rest and that those 
troops with the longest period of active service should not be called upon to reinforce our division in 
the Pacific until men with no active service have had their turn’. See Wood, The New Zealand People 
at War, p. 265; ANZ WAII/1/DA565/1 NZEF Times, 15 September, 1943. 
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War, as George Orwell wrote, ‘above all . . . brings home to the individual that 
he is not altogether an individual’.140 Parties, such as Labour, that harnessed this ideal 
and emphasised the role of the state in arbitrating between sectional interests in 
society, were better placed than those that emphasised personal freedoms and the 
market economy to benefit from these dynamics. Taking the Labour and Democratic 
Labour vote in 1943 together, the ‘left leaning’ vote was 51 per cent among civilians 
in New Zealand and 65 per cent among the mostly Air Force personnel serving in the 
UK, the most dangerous part of the war effort for New Zealanders in September 1943 
(see Table Two). For the soldiers who fought and the communities they represented, 
the meaning of the war went far beyond victories and defeats on the battlefield. In the 
case of New Zealand, Labour’s great experiment in social citizenship in the Twentieth 
Century could arguably have floundered had it lost the 1943 general election. The 
votes of service personnel politicised by their experience of the Second World War 
proved decisive. A spirit of social cohesion had emerged from the exigencies of 
combat cohesion, with profound results for the future of New Zealand. 
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140 George Orwell, ‘The Lion and the Unicorn’, in The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters, Vol. 2 
(Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970), p. 117. 
